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Scientific knowledge about the process of embryonic development has 
provoked new and challenging issues for moral debate. The possibility of 
cultivating embryonic stem cells to alleviate neurological disorders, such 
as Parkinson's disease, has raised to new heights the ethical question of 
killing embryos for these purposes. In addition, proponents of abortion 
have invoked the process of embryonic development to challenge the views 
of those who contend that life is to be protected from the first moment of 
existence. 
In this essay, I argue that embryonic development and the notion of 
personhood have been misused in order to justify utilitarian interventions 
upon embryonic life as well as to deny immunity from abortion to 
embryonic human life. I make this argument in reference to two different, 
but related, discussions of early abortion. The first discussion is that of Dr. 
Jean Porter in her essay on moral action, and the second is the stated 
position of a biotechnology firm that asserts a "developmental theory of 
personhood" in defense of early abortion to cultivate fetal stem cells. 
Dr. Jean Porter has written an extremely insightful and thoughtful 
book l that deserves careful attention by those engaged in health care ethics. 
Her recovery of the contributions of Aquinas to contemporary moral 
debates regarding the moral act is especially timely and compelling. 
However, she introduces her own, in my view, problematic assessment of 
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the morality of abortion in the context of her di scussion of the views of 
Aquinas on the issue.2 
Acknowledging that Aquinas subscribed to the biological information 
of hi s time, she also endorses Joseph Donceel's view that the theory of 
"delayed hominization" is not harmed by newer genetic information and 
stands on its own merits. That is, the physical, emotional, and social 
contexts encountered by nascent life in its developmental odyssey are still 
"morally relevant" circumstances. These developmental stages, according 
to the theory, possess significant valence to withhold judgment that 
"animation" or "ensoulment" (scholastic terminology for the presence of 
unique human identity) has occurred at the first moment of conception.3 
Dr. Porter argues that the allied concepts of non-maleficence (the 
cardinal principle of medical ethics, "first do no harm") and equality, 
notions ingredient and central to the moral perspective of Aquinas (and, 
thereby linking him to us moderns), do not constitute an outright 
prohibition of abortion. The burdens of an unwanted pregnancy or the 
plight of conjoined twins are among the conditions that can justify an early 
abortion , in Dr. Porter's perspective. The onset of brain activity constitutes 
an important benchmark for Dr. Porter and, to her credit, she is opposed to 
later term abortions. 
I find this argument "curious" because it implies that the criteria of 
non-maleficence and equality are not fully applicable to embryonic/fetal 
life. Earlier in the book, Dr. Porter assesses the Thomistic tradition and 
argues, persuasively, that euthanasia is not permissible because the notion 
of equality, properly understood, entails obligations of respect that cannot 
be set aside. In other words, modern understandings of equality as a 
synonym for autonomy, fail to capture the denser, more textured moral 
commitments embedded in Aquinas 's understanding of equality. The 
respect that is owed to human life cannot be surrendered or overridden even by 
"consenting adults." I find this rationale compelling, and am perplexed and 
even more "curious" that it is not extended to the abortion argument. 
Dr. Porter, among many others who weigh in on the side of early 
abortion in some circumstances, is unduly impressed by biological 
development as a fact in fetal life, and concludes that these stages are 
somehow "morally relevant." It is unimpeachably clear that human life is 
genetically human from its conception. Let's grant that increasing 
complexification, the acquisition of ever more refined capacities including 
brain activity, is built into the process of development. Nonetheless, why is 
it that these stages are "morally" significant? Why should it be permissible 
to extinguish a living human being simply because debatable individuating 
characteristics have not yet appeared? 
Each of these stages is genetically programmed to occur in the 
appropriate sequence at the appropriate time. Because human life is 
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ineluctably on a continuum of development, a continuum that will continue 
to floUli sh unless interrupted by accident or deliberate, willful intervention, 
why should particular stages of the continuum be privileged or, conversely, 
disvalued? To answer my own question, it seems to me that the point of 
these diverse assessments of developmental stages is to provide a 
justifiable rationale for killing. Additionally, I think that it is a failure of 
moral imagination to see these stages as discrete moments of existence 
rather than as organic aspects of existing human life. 
In other venues the mischievous lure of "biological development" 
takes on particular resonance in ethically questionable appropriations of 
the philosophical notion of "personhood." Paradoxically, an appeal to a 
certain construal of "personhood" has become a convenient device to 
justify killing of embryos for stem cell research. In fact, at this writing the 
Geron Corporation, a bio-tech firm in Menlo Park, CA, relies on its own 
Ethics Advisory Board 's endorsement of a "developmental theory of 
personhood" to support its embryonic research program. According to this 
understanding, the embryo/fetus "earns" the protectability and immunity 
associated with personhood as it acquires greater developmental 
complexity. Adopting an explicitly "pluralistic" approach to the criteria of 
personhood, the Geron Ethics Advisory Board contends that "the principle 
of respect for human life entails different considerations and entails 
different obligations at different developmental stages ."4 
Excluded from this protectability, of course, is the embryo with its 
valuable stem cells. I contend that "personhood" offers no meaningful 
protection from hann if it is understood "developmentally." If personhood 
does not, at the very least, mean " immunity from hann at any stage of 
development," then it is a dangerous philosophical abstraction that 
jeopardizes nascent human life. An entire literature has emerged around 
the question of the "personhood" of the early embryo. James McCartney 's 
study is quite useful in summarizing much of the scientific and ethical 
perspectives on thi s topic.5 The phenomenon of twinning, segmentation, 
the emergence of the "primitive streak," and other early embryonic 
structures, among others, have contributed to divergent ethical assessments 
about the applicability of the term "personhood" to embryonic life. 
McCartney insightfully points out that the philosophical and religious 
intuitions of Pope John Paul II lead the pope to a different conceptualization 
about the meaning ofpersonhood.6 Much of the discussion in this literature 
about the moral status of the embryo is directed at the applicability of the 
notion of personhood to embryonic life . My point in this essay is that the 
more fundamental issue is not the applicability of the notion, but the 
criteria that govern the conceptual understanding of personhood itself. 
I do not think that the biological complexity of embryonic 
development constitutes a warrant for the killing of embryonic/fetal life. 
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Killing is the critical issue, and the mask of "personhood" should not 
obscure this reality. The notion of personhood needs to be rescued from the 
distortions imported into its meaning by the Geron Ethics Advisory Board 
and those who subscribe to the "developmental theory of personhood." At 
the very least, personhood requires the concrete embodiment of the values 
of non-maleficence and equality that Dr. Porter has identified as central to 
the moral vision of Aquinas. Otherwise, embryos are subjected to the kind 
of harmful selectivity inherent in the "developmental theory of personhood" 
embraced by the Geron Ethics Advisory Board. 
Stanley Hauerwas offers a salutary caution against reliance on abstract 
notions like "personhood" in his short but pointed essay, "Must a Patient be 
a Person to be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie is not Much of a Person, but 
He is Still My Uncle Charlie."? The point of Hauerwas's deceptively 
whimsical essay is that among the "givens" of human life are relationships 
and moral connections to others that are not grounded in our personal 
choices and desires. "Uncle Charlie," warts and all, may not demonstrate 
the attributes desired in a nice "person" but he is, nonetheless, an 
undeniable "fact on the ground" who has claims of family upon us, and to 
whom we owe certain obligations, regardless of his unsavory "personhood." 
Relying on a notion like "personhood" to determine who is to count as a 
morally protectable subject is risky business if the criteria for "personhood" 
are developed in isolation from the moral practices, attitudes and 
commitments that are concretely enfleshed in the Christian story about the 
meaning and purpose of our lives. 
Alasdair Macintyre's observation that we inhabit a world of moral 
"fragments" without a coherent and unifying moral center lies at the heart 
of the intractable lack of moral consensus in our liberal, post-
enlightenment contemporary culture.8 The notion of "personhood" is one 
such fragment that has lost its ancestral philosophical and religious 
moorings originally designed to name the unrepeatable dignity of each 
human subject. 
In Maclntrye's account of moral philosophy, our moral notions and 
principles are not immune from the influence of historical and cultural 
forces that shape the vision or "story" of the values by which we order our 
lives. Our contemporary world, whether we characterize it as "modem" or 
"post-modem," or even "post-Christian," prizes the values of technical 
reason, autonomy, and efficiency as components of its "story" of moral 
order. According to this ethical narrative, moral reason is largely 
"instrumental," that is, a process of reflection and judgment that is 
pragmatic, utilitarian and directed towards the achievement of the desired 
outcomes and goals of human action. It is not surprising, then, that a notion 
like "personhood" detached from its philosophical and religious tradition is 
molded to achieve purposes not foreseen in its original architecture. 
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Regrettably, the notion has now become a fortuitous tool for abortion 
advocates and the biotechnology industry. In contemporary parlance, 
"personhood" is not so much a description of intrinsic, inviolable worth as 
it is a "something extra" ascribed to a member of the human species to 
justify its existence. That "something extra" may be intelligence, brain 
wave activity, mobility or a host of other " individuating" qualities that have 
served as candidates to ground the ascription of maximum protectability 
and immunity from hann. Personhood, in other words, is understood as an 
"ascribed" status, whereby those who are powerful set the rules concerning 
those who are to count as members of the human species. 
For the unfortunate embryo selected for stem cell cultivation, the 
"developmental theory of personhood" is a slim consolation for its 
deprivation of life. Moreover, a public policy grounded in such an 
understanding threatens the lives of all that are similarly vulnerable. 
Consider the plight of the developmentally disabled, to cite but one 
example. Does the embryo/fetus deserve to be included among those who 
are entitled to non-maleficence and equality? I think these notions, prized 
by Aquinas, are most certainly applicable to our "developing" human kin. 
I have deep appreciation for Dr. Porter's astute assessment that the 
analysis of the moral act is not "theory-driven," but rather a dialogical 
process requiring analogical construal of significant elements. Conclusions 
are not deduced with apodictic certainty. Moral notions are "open-ended", 
but do have normativity deriving from a focal point of pertinent 
considerations. Dr. Porter locates this "focal point" for Aquinas in the 
allied notions, mentioned above, of non-maleficence and equality. Since it 
is clear from the tradition that Aquinas did not endorse abortion in spite of 
the Aristotelian biology he inherited, it appears to me that these notions of 
non-maleficence and equality logically should be extended to embryonic/ 
fetal life. 
I think that prudence is required to prevent the risk of unwarranted 
harm to the embryo/fetus as well as to assure its equality as a member of 
the human species. On this score, the Church in its 1974 Declaration on 
Abortion strikes the right balance by deftly avoiding the philosophical 
question of when "ensoulment" takes place.9 Relying on the principle that 
"what will be human is still human," the Church places the burden of proof 
on those who support early abortion. In my view, the supporters of early 
abortion have not made their case. Developmental stages are interesting, 
even compelling, but they do not constitute morally relevant factors to 
justify killing a being that is unarguably human as it negotiates its 
developmental history. I am not convinced that Dr. Porter's construal of 
Aquinas 's commitment to non-maleficence and equality supports her 
justification of early abortion. Moreover, I am equally unconvinced by the 
pluralistic criteria for "personhood" endorsed by the Geron Ethics 
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Advisory Board. Unless there is a moral "firewall" to protect our 
embryonic cousins from the misuse of the process of biological 
development and the related moral notion of "personhood," utilitarian 
appropriations of their lives will tragically and sadly continue. 
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